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ABSTRACT

Age, sex, and ethnic trade-offs in faculty employment in higher education give rise to dilemmas--situations requiring a choice between equally undesirable alternatives. When an over-age-65 faculty member retains a full time position, someone else--probably a woman, ethnic minority, and/or young person--is deprived of a position. The problem of age discrimination against older people becomes the probably worse problem of age discrimination against younger people. Losses to the nation's future are seen in negative impact on young people's professional careers and negative feedback to secondary and undergraduate students who will not consider academic careers. National demographic and enrollment projections and associated faculty requirement forecasts share a pessimistic prediction of faculty demand in the 1980-90s. Recommendations include expanding adult enrollment, increasing retirement and/or quit rates, and providing interim alternative "academic-like" employment. Given the situation of fluctuating and generally declining clientele, continuing inflation, plus mandates to practice affirmative action while protecting older faculty from age discrimination, a possible but unjust trade-off is hiring faculty not on tenure track. The issue of tenure must be faced by designing some kind of performance evaluation to create new positions and improve quality. (Seven figures are attached.) (YLB)

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AGE, SEX AND ETHNIC TRADE-OFFS IN FACULTY EMPLOYMENT: YOU CAN'T HAVE YOUR CAKE AND EAT IT TOO

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The word "trade-off" is critical to the theme of this paper. I am using it in the strict dictionary sense, "an exchange; especially, a giving up of one benefit, advantage, etc., in order to gain another regarded as more desirable". This definition implies a conscious consideration of an option or options and a decision that it would be desirable to give up some current benefit or advantage for one or more of the alternatives. As I will try to make clear in subsequent discussion, I believe that this important step of conscious decision is frequently slighted or entirely bypassed. Put another way, the rational consideration of alternatives, a kind of cost/benefit analysis and selection of minimum cost/maximum benefit options does not seem to be very popular today. This takes the form of a dilemma (a dilemma is a situation requiring a choice between equally undesirable alternatives) when we make the trade-off today to ease a particular political pressure and do not consider the implications for tomorrow. Frequently, the cure (tomorrow) may be worse than the disease (today). As an extreme example, consider AB 577, passed by the California legislature in 1963 and signed into law by then-governor Pat Brown. This bill provides pension benefits to California political leaders. Under the formula of this law, Max Rafferty, who served eight years as superintendent of public instruction under Ronald Reagan, now receives an annual pension of $42,500, which is equal to the annual salary of the current superintendent, Wilson Riles. However, if one assumes there is six percent inflation per year, this position will pay $70,000 annually in 1990 but the pension will be almost twice that, namely $132,000. Again at six percent inflation per year, the current governor of California would receive a pension of over $300,000 in 1998, whereas the incumbent governor would be paid $100,000 at that time.

Let us now look at some of those trade-offs mentioned in the title. I want to take age first -- the age versus age trade-off. Each over-age-65 faculty member who retains a full-time position will deprive someone else of a position -- and that someone else will probably be a woman, an ethnic minority, young person, or a combination of two or three of these! In fact, it is generally worse than <u>one</u> "beyond normal retirement" position depriving just <u>one</u> "someone else" of a position because the over-age-65 person usually has a senior position with a salary roughly twice that of the junior starting faculty; therefore, each continuing (beyond normal retirement) faculty will deprive <u>two</u> junior faculty of positions. We talk glibly about age discrimination and affirmation action. Discrimination is defined as differential treatment, making a difference in favor or against. Clearly, mandatory retirement (absolute retirement at some arbitrary age, such as 65) is discrimination against older people.

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The new Federal law and proposals to eliminate mandatory retirement at any age, using our definition of discrimination, do make a difference in favor of the old faculty, but they result in discrimination against all those seeking faculty positions -- women, ethnic minorities and younger people. As was already pointed out, those denied will outnumber those favored by as much as two to one. Thus in solving one discrimination we have created another one.

There are some other important considerations. Almost all of those faculty near or at the current "mandatory" retirement age -- usually 65-70 -- have had a professional lifetime of 30-40 years to plan for their retirements; they have known for years what the retirement age was, and their institutions have retirement plans that provide fiscal contributions to income for life. Although inflation has eroded some retirement incomes, it has also caused radical increases in many property values. Many near-retirement-age faculty own one or more homes and other property, most of which has large appreciated value (and Congress has now given older homeowners a $100,000 tax-free capital gains allowance). Compare this position to that of our aspiring younger men, women and minority "potential" faculty, who have a difficult time finding faculty positions and who often must settle for non-tenure-track positions, lower paid part-time teaching or staff positions, or non-academic jobs. These aspiring younger people are <u>not</u> worrying about the large taxes they may be required to pay if they sell appreciated property. They are desperately trying to figure out how they can first raise the down payment and then make the huge monthly outlays required for a 10½ - 11% mortgage on a vastly-inflated home price. We should not forget that the extension of the mandatory retirement age was voted in by a dominantly older, male legislature who were undoutedly personally empathic with victims of age discrimination. These same Congressmen have increased Social Security benefits over the years without much thought about the long-range fiscal implications; the new benefits are nice but meeting the added costs is something else -- another case of wanting to eat the cake and have it too. The impending bankruptcy of the Social Security system finally forced Congress to the twin actions of greatly increasing the Social Security tax and extending the mandatory retirement age to 70. I don't think we should kid ourselves into believing that an extension (or elimination) of age-related mandatory retirement solves the problem of age discrimination. What it does is to turn the problem of age discrimination against older people into the probably worse problem of age discrimination against younger people.

The denial of faculty positions to thousands of well-educated, vigorous young people will have a profoundly negative impact on their professional careers -- a loss to the nation's future which is difficult to assess, but it must be significant. Perhaps an even larger long-term loss to the nation is the negative feedback to secondary school and undergraduate students who will not even consider academic careers. Many young college people have indicated to me some hostility toward what they feel are self-serving, status quo attitudes of tenured faculty. A prominent government official recently told me that he believed a primary factor in the increased Congressional interest in the regulation of colleges and universities came from Congressional staff. He pointed out that the number of Congressional staff has greatly increased in the last decade;

most are college graduates of the sixties and early seventies, and many are dissatisfied with the behavior of faculty. This is an interesting comment that merits more serious attention.

Before presenting a data-based analysis of the age, sex and ethnic trade-offs, I would like to expand on some general and somewhat philosophical ideas about the future of higher education and affirmative action. I think we would all argue that higher education is at a crossroads. Perhaps the words of Robert Frost are appropriate:

> "Two roads diverged in a wood and I took the one less travelled by... and that has made all the difference."

Higher education has usually taken the road most travelled, but now history affords us the choice of many roads -- do we have the courage to try more of those less travelled by?

During the rapid expansionary phase of the past twenty years, higher education was preoccupied with materialistic functions -- building more facilities to accommodate more students (it was a seller's market) and hiring more faculty. More recently, increased attention is being given academic programs -- but we have hardly begun. In the more than thirty years since the end of World War II our society has changed about as greatly as in the entire prior span of recorded history. It seems clear that our citizens had great hopes and expectations of higher education -- perhaps unrealistic-- but we were all too willing to take their money without demur. The important reason for earning a college degree for most young people was the promise of a secure life and well-paid employment. This has recently proved to be an empty promise for many young college graduates. The future would appear to offer continued (if not increased) changes together with emerging career opportunities and the decline of some existing employment markets. I do not propose here to become involved in any detailed analysis of the campus curriculum options related to liberal arts versus professionalism versus vocationalism. It does seem clear that the need is for a college education that will provide the intellectual and psychological base for a lifetime of change. We need people who are comfortable and secure with change -- who see change as an opportunity and a challenge, not as a threat. Perhaps even more importantly, we need to encourage and inculcate an attitude of appreciation of the joy of lifelong learning, a constant and continuing search for truth and understanding. Our complex, changing world needs these people and they more than most have the best chance for leading meaningful, constructive and happy lives. I have the feeling that we are not doing very well in providing this kind of education. And how does this relate to my topic and the trade-offs? We have a rich diversity in our society but it is not very well represented in the ranks of our college and university faculty. I believe that if our faculty were more diverse -- a good mix by age from youth through the older years, more females, more ethnic groups -- there would be a better chance that those less-travelled roads would be taken, that more people would share in the joy of learning, and that we would have more college graduates facing a changing world with optimism and confidence.

I do not advocate discrimination of any type -- age, sex, ethnic, religious, etc. We need to remind ourselves that the ultimate goal of all affirmative action programs is for them to self-destruct because they are no longer necessary. In the interim, we can't eat that cake and still have it too. Currently, we do have a general lack of any effective mechanism for removal of unproductive faculty of any age. With the extension of mandatory retirement age this problem will get worse and will inevitably cause a decline in academic vitality at a time when it is critically needed. We will increasingly deny younger faculty career opportunities, and many talented younger people of both sexes and all ethnic backgrounds will seek better opportunities outside of academe. The consequences could be disastrous for the university and tragic for the nation.

Having made these strong statements, I need to provide some quantitative information on the extent of faculty employment problems. There are a number of national demographic and enrollment projections and associated faculty requirement forecasts. Although these vary in methodology and results, they all have one common feature, namely a pessimistic prediction of faculty demand in the eighties, especially after 1982, and perhaps extending throughout the nineties. Figure 1 shows the 1977 Census Bureau projection of 18 year olds. Note that the number peaks in 1979 then drops sharply until 1986, increases slightly in 1987, 1988 and 1989, then drops drastically at least through 1992, beyond which time the change is small until the end of the century. Enrollment forecasts are a bit more tricky, and faculty needs are even more uncertain. In Figure 2 the Carnegie Council 1978 enrollment projections are shown.[1] These are based on the work of Cartter in 1976.[2] Note that the peak enrollment forecast is in 1982 with a steep decline thereafter until 1987, pause and slight increase in 1988 and 1989 and then another sharp decline until 1996 and possibly (by no means certain) increase thereafter. I will not examine here the assumptions about high school completion rates or college entrance rates. However, it should be mentioned that no radical increase in adult learners has been included. Estimated of the number of faculty can be based on the enrollment forecasts. The uncertainties are compounded but the general picture emerging, regardless of which assumptions or whose results are taken, is an unfavorable one. I will use here the Carnegie Council work of 1978. Figure 3 shows three of their projections of doctorate faculty demand. Note that doctorate faculty demand peaks in 1982, then declines rapidly until it plateaus in 1988 and 1989, increases slightly in 1990 and then declines strongly to a plateau in 1995 and 1996 and thereafter may increase to beyond the end of the century. It should be kept in mind that the Carnegie Council projections are all based on doctorates, currently about 55% of all faculty. In spite of this limitation, these forecasts do provide a national picture useful in thinking about policy changes. All such forecasts are subject to such a variety of interacting variables that they should be used with care.

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[1] Fernandez, Luis. U.S. Faculty After the Boom: Demographic Projections to 2000. Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education; 1978 April. (Technical Report No. 6).

[2] Cartter, Alan. Ph.D's and the Academic Labor Market. New York: McGraw-Hill; 1976.

In the Carnegie forecasts there are three sceanarios: (1) Pro-cyclical in which the doctoral faculty/student ratio decreases (pessimistic), (2) baseline in which this ratio stays constant, and (3) counter-cyclical in which this ratio increases (optimistic). The changes in total doctoral faculty demand from year to year range from as large as 7900 to negative 4400 per year depending on the year and the scenario chosen. These numbers are not the numbers of new hires since some faculty leave due to denial of tenure, death and retirement and those who quit may be leaving academia whereas others are taking an academic position at another institution. This later group must be substracted from total new hires to arrive at positions available for new doctorates. The combination of continuing faculty, promotion and tenure rates, quits, deaths, retirement, hiring policy (rank, age, sex, ethicity, salary) consistent with total faculty demand, provides a large number of interacting variables. The Carnegie Council results are as follows:

Figure 4: The median age of tenured faculty increases rapidly in all three scenarios whereas that of non-tenured faculty remains approximately constant. (Most non-tenured positions are "churning" -- young people don't stay long enough to get old).
Figure 5: The tenure ratio increases rapidly in all three scenarios.
Figure 6: New doctorate hires decline in all three scenarios until 1995 and may increase thereafter.

Some perspective on new doctorate hires can be obtained by looking at the years of rapid expansion, 1961-70. The average number of new hires was 10,800 compared to an estimated 10,400 in 1978 and an average of 6,400 per year under the baseline projection (shown in Figure 6) between 1983 and 1998. Under the pro-cyclical forecast, which may be the more probable, new doctorate hires will be even less, by about 20%. In the 1961-70 era of expansion, total annual production of new doctorates increased from 10,600 to 29,900 (compared to the average new doctorate hires of 10,800 per year); thus 60% of all these new doctorates were hired back to academe. However in the 1979-88 years, new doctorates are projected to be about 400,000 and the new doctorate hires projected in the baseline forecast are about 80,000 -- thus the faculty market would be about 20% of the doctorate production!

There are many interesting details in these various projections and how they change under different assumptions. Our interest here will be to present summary results and apply them to our trade-offs discussion. Basically there are only two ways in which faculty openings can be increased. One is by a large expansion in adult enrollments. The other is by removal of presently-tenurd faculty - for example by increasing retirement and/or quit rates. The new laws counteract this option by raising the retirement age. Trying to increase the openings for new doctorates by policies affecting the non-tenured faculty only increases "churning" -- new doctorate faculty coming in and then out. Tenured faculty quits may be encouraged by the lower-than-inflation faculty salary increases (which may encourage the best tenured faculty to leave), by an evaluation process which would, hopefully, encourage the deadwood to early retirement or to leave for other types of employment and by early retirement incentives. Some rough estimates of the potential magnitude of tenured faculty quits would be useful in developing policy. The Carnegie Council studied low,

medium and high quit rates for both tenured and non-tenured faculty and concluded that although increasing quit rates of tenured faculty do help to minimize or even reverse the adverse effects of declining faculty demand, these benefits risk a deterioration in the quality of faculty caused by larger quit rates. They use a mean high quit rate of tenured faculty of 2% per year, 1% for medium quit rate, and 0.5% for low quit rate. These rates seem low from our experience working with a limited number of specific institutions. It would also seem quite possible, with a good evaluation program, to selectively encourage "quits" of the really poorly performing tenured faculty, thereby increasing the quality of faculty -- a conclusion opposite to that of the Carnegie Council. The turnover rates (annual new hired as a percent of total faculty) projected in the Carnegie Council studies range from 2.3 - 5.0% for their "low" tenure quit rate scenario, 2.8 - 5.2% for their "medium" rate and 3.2 - 5.6% for their "high" rate from 1976 to 1995. Our studies indicate that a minimum turnover rate of 5% is desirable. At my own institution, the total tenure quit rate has been 3-4% over the last five years and 18-20% for non-tenured faculty with no special incentives. These rates include retirement and death -- .33 of the tenured quits have been retirement and .08 were due to death.

Another factor affecting trade-offs is the way we use our resources. Many educational institutions have had a problem with internal inflation of faculty salaries. I define internal inflation as a cost increase which exceeds the external inflation. For faculty salaries it is caused by an increasing proportion of higher ranked and/or higher salary step faculty. Internal inflation happened recently because of little or no growth in total faculty and poor management control of salary step and rank promotions. During the rapid expansion of faculty in the last 20 years we sometimes had internal deflation - actual average faculty salaries increased less than the external inflation, because we were hiring large numbers of new junior (and low cost) faculty. As an example, Table I shows a typical salary scale for four academic ranks with five salary steps for each, a total of 20 different salary -- rank salary levels. Consider the following examples:

A. 100 faculty equally distributed, 5 in each of the 20 salary levels. The average cost per faculty member would be $18,324.

B. 100 faculty: 6 Instructors, 2 each in steps 3, 4, and 5; 20 Assistant Professors, 2-step 1, 3-step 2, 4-step 3, 5-step 4, 6-step 5; 30 Associate Professors, 4-step 1, 5-step 2, 6-step 3, 7-step 4, 8-step 5; 40 Professors, 6-step 1, 7-step 2, 8-step 3, 9-step 4, 10-step 5. The average cost per faculty member would be $20,811.

We have found schools with faculty distributions like our example B. The average faculty cost for B is 13.6% more than for A. We also have found some schools or departments with faculty distributions less costly than A; likewise we find some more costly than B. In addition to the added cost of faculty distributions like B, there is also a morale problem. For example, one school at a university we studied, with a faculty of 100, has 60% of its faculty as full professors, and one-half of them are in the highest salary step. Most of these faculty are still mid-career (i.e., 10-20

years before retirement). Both faculty and administration indicated to us poor morale because of lack of advancement opportunity - resulting in an increasing commitment to activities outside the institution.

TABLE I
Faculty Rank-Salary Schedule

Rank	Step 1	2	3	4	5
Full Professor	23,023	24,366	25,079	27,051	28,394
Assoc. Prof.	17,617	18,306	18,996	20,338	21,681
Asst. Prof.	14,411	14,980	15,549	16,248	16,927
Instructor	11,567	12,136	12,705	13,273	13,842

Faculty retirement has become a special concern. The increase in mandatory retirement age (and possibly its elimination altogether) coupled with high tenure rates and the declining faculty market has created an urgency in reviewing both early and late retirement. The effect of increased age on faculty vitality, especially beyond 60 and 65, is a debatable issue. Although I recognize that there are some very creative and productive faculty who are 65, 70 and even 75 and 80, I believe the preponderance of research evidence indicates that vitality does decline on the average at higher ages -- and this decline increases with age, especially beyond 60 or 65. If this is true, what is needed is good, humane processes to retire those who should retire and to retain those who are still very productive. I don't think we currently have such processes.

How important is the retirement issue? The Carnegie Council explored three scenarios, namely the no change response (NCR) and the extreme response (XR). Under NCR faculty would retire at the old normal age and for the XR all retirements would take place at age 70. The third scenario (mild response) assumed a middle ground between the other two responses. They report generally that no large changes are found among the three scenarios and conclude that late retirement is not very detrimental (the XR scenario results in about 8% fewer positions than the mild response) but neither is early retirement very helpful. The Carnegie Council report concludes that the best way to provide a smooth flow of young doctorates into academia is either to smooth faculty demand during the next two decades or to provide alternative "academic-like" employment until colleges are capable of absorbing an increasing number of young faculty.

I don't believe these solutions are either realistic or very helpful. I think that higher education will only receive significantly more resources if it either radically improves its service to society or expands its market by greatly increasing lifelong learning, or both. At the moment I don't see either happening to such an extent that it will significantly impact society and thus our resources. I therefore reluctantly conclude that we will be constrained to live with existing resources which may, in fact, increase at a slower rate than inflation. Furthermore, the national projections mask a lot of differences among our diverse institutions. Discipline differences can also cause problems; today we may be forced to terminate faculty in humanities or social sciences at the same time we search desparately for faculty in business or electrical engineering.

Tomorrow it may be different surpluses. For a few institutions, the situation is a bit better than the national forecasts -- for them enrollments may increase somewhat or remain steady-state. However, for many institutions, the future will probably be much worse -- enrollments will decline more precipitously and this will exacerbate faculty problems. Some will not survive and many others face a bleak future.

Let me give an example using changing retirement ages. We studied a university arts and science faculty of 292. With an early retirement plan in which 10% of the faculty retired at ages 60, 61, 63 and 64, 20% retired at 62 and all the remaining retired at 65, and a continuation of all other current policy and practice (tenure, promotion; age, rank, salary of new hires, etc.) and a steady-state over ten years, there would be 152 new hires, 62.6% of the original faculty would remain to start the eleventh year and the "churning factor" would be 1.39 (total number of openings over ten years divided by original faculty departing). When we extended retirement to age 72 (5% retired at 62; 20% of the balance at 65; 10% at 66; 15% at 67, 68, 69; 50% at 70; 25% at 71; all of the balance at 72) and decreased the total number of faculty by 1% per year, we had 74 new hires over the ten years (a decrease of 51%) and 79% of the original faculty remained to start the eleventh year. This example illustrates that retirements interacting with total number of faculty can have a major impact. Since mandatory retirement will be extended to at least age 70 and some faculty will undoubtedly want to stay on, those institutions with significant enrollment declines (and concomitant decline in total faculty) will be much more adversely effected. New hires can drop to zero in some years - this will make it more difficult for such institutions to bring in the new people they may require for increasing their program vitality. The lack of new faculty in these cases will be a negative feedback which may cause still further enrollment decline, creating a cycle of continuing deterioration which could destroy the institution.

The difficulties in reaching affirmative action goals can be illustrated by our study of a community college. This college is located in a metropolitan area with 25% minority population. The current faculty of 200 is 11.6% minority. The college feels it should have a faculty approximating the minority composition of the community served. The faculty is highly tenured and over one-half are at the top salary level. Enrollments are slowly declining and the total faculty will be decreasing. Hiring 25% minority faculty, with a loss of two faculty positions per year (approximately 1%) and <u>without</u> late retirement (at this institution retirements start at age 55), would give 18.5% minority faculty in ten years. With a 50% minority hire rate and decreasing total faculty (two positions per year) the 25% minority goal can be reached in ten years; however, adding realistic late retirement (retirement starting in the late fifties and extending to mandatory at 70) reduces the minority faculty to 20% after ten years even with a 50% hire rate. Some of these effects are illustrated in Figure 7. This institution illustrates the trade-offs quite dramatically! Current faculty, almost all tenured, are virtually assured lifetime positions (poor performance is not important), and minorities, women and young people have very little opportunity to secure

a position. As suggested earlier, such a situation may insure the decline of the college.

Are these situations unusual? Are they necessarily bad? No, I don't think they are that unusual and yes, I think they are bad. Perhaps some few institutions should close but I feel that society could use more, and not less education. Higher education is important to the future of humankind. As we become increasingly aware that we must learn to live in a resource constrained world, education could and should play a more important role. The trend at the moment seems to be in the opposite direction. What can we do?

Given the situation of fluctuating and generally declining clientele, continuing inflation plus mandates to practice affirmative action while simultaneously protecting the older faculty from age discrimination, what trade-offs can be made? One option is to hire faculty not on tenure track. Today all types of faculty or faculty-like opportunities that are not tenure-track are on the increase. Last fall the AAUP Bulletin published a committee report on full-time non-tenure-track appointments.[3] This report states that the increasing number of non-tenure-track appointments is, (1) unjust and inequitable, (2) a threat to academic freedom, and (3) unnecessary. I agree with reason one but I am not convinced about three. Non-tenure-track opportunities are necessary if we are to continue tenure as it presently operates. The AAUP report does suggests the alternative of "... work out a rough formula which takes into consideration such factors as current and projected enrollment, relative centrality of the field in the institution's educational program, tenure percentages, and the like." This seems like a weak proposal which begs the issue. The real problems are that the number of faculty positions is now expanding only slowly and will soon decline and we have an increasingly highly tenured faculty in generally rather rigid disciplinary slots and of varying competency. Furthermore, our lifelong learning efforts are usually hampered by the second-class status of continuing education, the lack of regular faculty appointments and the use of part-time faculty or regular faculty on overload. The system is unjust and inequitable (as stated by AAUP) because the part-time and non-tenure -track people cannot be considered for tenure track positions no matter how competent they are or how outstanding their performance; likewise, tenured people generally are not terminated no matter how poor their performance. This is indeed a situation which discourages, demoralizes and will surely cast a cloud on the future of higher education.

Thus we are faced with a dilemma, defined earlier, as you remember, as a choice between equally undesirable alternatives. We can continue to support a steadily aging, increasingly inflexible, expensive tenured faculty while keeping promising young and/or female and/or minority doctorates in some kind of holding pattern, or we can openly or tacitly abandon the tenure

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[3]Thomson, Judith J.; Sandalow, Terrance. On Full-Time Non-Tenure-Track Appointments. AAUP Bulletin. 1978 September; 64(3):267-273.

system and its protection of academic freedom. Truly we cannot eat our cake and have it too. The first step to coping with these problems is to accept this simple and basic fact. Seemingly we need more responsible individual behavior. Both older faculty and administrators should work to create more faculty positions. Many older faculty should retire; others may go on part-time or go into other work. There is no law that prevents beyond-normal-retirement-age people from continuing work <u>without</u> salary, thus freeing their positions for younger people! I have known faculty who did this in past years. Tenure is an issue whose time seems to have arrived. It seems to me we have two choices - either make tenure work (as it always was supposed to) or we will lose it (perhaps to something less desirable). To make it work, we need some kind of performance evaluation - which should be designed to assist those who are not at acceptable levels of performance to improve, but we must also face the harsh facts that some won't or can't improve. Ultimately some deadwood must be terminated. This will not only create new positions but it will also improve quality. These will be difficult decisions but if we don't make them, all of academe will suffer as a result. It is absolutely essential that we revitalize higher education - that the tenure concept be used to protect academic freedom and not the imcompetent or those who would make a mockery of it. And, if we would enhance lifelong learning - as I believe we should, we must give full academic status to those devoting their academic lives to continuing education and adult learning. This could be a major new thrust for higher education but it won't be unless we cope with the academic status problems.

In conclusion, I am urging both more realism and more idealism. The realism urges a stop to hand-wringing and positive action to do more with current resources. We could cope with tenure if we really wanted to do so - everyone knows it is misused. We can't expect taxpayers to provide additional funding when they know we aren't making that good an effort to use what we have. We must give young people and women and minorities more opportunities for academic careers. And, finally, we need to dream of the future - for lives beyond our resource throw-away industrial society - a society in which education can be a dominant factor in meaningful and happy lives for people of all ages regardless of ethnicity, sex or religious beliefs. Do we dare try those less travelled roads?

Figure 1

U.S. Census Projections
Number of 18-Year Olds



1973 Projections, Series F after 1992

1977 Projections, Series III after 1995

Figure 2

FTE Enrollment Projections
Carnegie Council Baseline Series



Baseline Projection No. 1

Carter's Projection using 1973 Census Data

Baseline Projection No. 2, constant after 1995

Figure 3

Projections of Doctorate Faculty Demand



- "Pro-Cyclical" Projection (Falling Faculty-Student Ratio)
- "No Change" or Baseline Projection (Constant Faculty-Student Ratio)
- "Counter-Cyclical" Projection (Rising Faculty-Student Ratio)

Figure 4

Projections of Median Ages
Tenured and Non-Tenured Faculty



● "Pro-Cyclical" Projection (Falling Faculty-Student Ratio)

▬ "No Change" or Baseline Projection (Constant Faculty-Student Ratio)

○ "Counter-Cyclical" Projection (Rising Faculty-Student Ratio)

Figure 5

Projections of Tenure Ratio



● "Pro-Cyclical" Projection (Falling Faculty-Student Ratio)

▬ "No Change" or Baseline Projection (Constant Faculty-Student Ratio)

○ "Counter-Cyclical" Projection (Rising Faculty-Student Ratio)

Figure 6

Projections of New Doctorates Hires



● "Pro-Cyclical" Projection (Falling Faculty-Student Ratio)

▬ "No Change" or Baseline Projection (Constant Faculty-Student Ratio)

○ "Counter-Cyclical" Projection (Rising Faculty-Student Ratio)

Figure 7

Affirmative Action Goals
A Community College



- ● Total Number of Faculty (Decline of Two Faculty/Year)
- ⊗ 50% Hire Rate, Current Retirement
- ▬ 25% Hire Rate, Current Retirement
- o 50% Hire Rate, Early and Late Retirement
- • 25% Hire Rate, Early and Late Retirement